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UTAH SUPREME OOURT 
DONALD R. ALLEK-PETITIONER 
vs. 
TIE STATE OF UTAH-RESFONDENT 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS 
PETITIONER, Donald R. Allen, respectfully prays that a writ 
of certiorari issue to review the judgement and opinion of the 
Utah Court of Apoeals granting summary disposition and dismissing 
his appeal from a conviction of aggravated assault in the Second 
Judicial District Court. 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is cited as State of 
Utah v. Donald R. *\llen, 910316-CA, filed 2 December 1991. The 




The ^ourt of Appeals1 Opinion in this matter was filed on 
2 )ecenber 1991• A timely motion for an extension of time was filed 
in this Court, to allow the petitioner to file this petition, on 
31 December 1991. 
Jurisdiction to hear this matter is conferred on this Court 
pursuant to Pule 42 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, and 
Title 78-2-2(3)(a), of the Utah Code Ann. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
Article I section 12 of trie Utah Constitution is set forth 
in Appendix B. 
Amendment VI to the United States Constitution is set forth 
in Appendix C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioner was convicted of aggravated assault in the 
Second Judicial district Court, Judge Douglas Cornaby presiding. 
An appeal was taken, and filed in the Utan Court of Appeals. 
The petitioner retained Stanley Adams to brief and argue his 
appeal in the Court of Appeals. Prior to the time the brief was 
filed by Ilr. Adams, the petitioner made numerous attempts to 
contact him and communicate points the petitioner wanted incluied 
the appeal. Kr. Adams made no attempt to comply withthe petitioners 
wishes. Kr. Aiams sought and received several extensions of time 
in which to file the brief in the first appeal. ..hen the brief 
was in the initial stages Mr. Adams contacted the petitioner and 
2. 
told him that ne could be more creative in the writing of the 
brief, if the petitioner wouli send him more money, r-.s the 
oetitioner was incarcerated, and could raise no further cash, he 
told i'.r. Adams that he could not give him more money. 
Kr. Adams then filed the brief. The brief filed by counsel did 
not reet the requirements of the court and was returned to be made 
to comnly with the Pules of Appellate Procedure. The brief was then 
refiled, however, counsel had failed to make any reference to any 
case supporting the petitioners position, nor had ne cited any 
statutes, or law. The brief was bare of anything other than one 
long argument. The court ruled in favor of the state without 
oral argument. The courts unpublished decision is set forth in 
Appendix D. Prior to the courts decision, the petitioner filed a 
motion for appointment of counsel, and an extension of time so 
that new counsel could re-brief the case. The court denied the 
motion, "he motions are set forth in Appendix E. The motion for 
appointment of counsel made clear that counsel was not following 
the wishes of the oetitioner, was trying to get more money to 
write a better brief, and generally sabotaging tne appeal. 
Afetr the courts opinion was released, the petitioner filed 
a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Rule 65B(i), 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in tne ,rr,hird Judicial 
District Court. The petition is set forth in Appendix F. Judge 
Noell of the Third Judicial District Court, upon recommendation 
of deputy Attorney General Kirk Torgenson, vacated the petitioners 
sentence, and orderei. the petitioner resentenced so tnat he ma; 
perfect a new appeal. T^e Gourts order is set forth in appendix G. 
The netitioner was resentenced by Judge Cornaby to tne same 
terms of imprisonment. Counsel was appointed by the court to 
undertake a new appeal. Fr. .tephen Oda was appointed to represent 
the petitioner. 3efore the appeal was completed Kr. Oda was relieved 
as a public defender and t r. I'ichael Tlurohy was appointed to 
finish the appeal started by kr. Cda. After I^ r. Vurnpy was appointed 
as counsel, the petitioner contacted him numerous times, and made 
clear that he wanted to review the material filed by counsel, prior 
to it being filed in the Court of Appeals. The petitioner also 
asked several times if Kr. Murphy had the decision of the Third 
District Court, so that he could file it with the Court of Appeals, 
and advise them of the reason for the resentencing, and second 
appeal. Counsel advised him that he had it, and that he filed it 
with the court. 
The State, by and through J Kevin Kurphy, filed a motion for 
summary disposition and requested that the appeal be dismissed, as 
the petitioner had already had one appeal, ho one in the Attorney 
Generals Office ever communicated that the counsel for tne State 
at the hearing in Third District Court nad moved for the petitioner 
to be resentenced to perfect an appeal. Likewise, counsel for 
the petitioner, despite his claims, never advised the court in the 
premise, of the reason for the second appeal, ^e never filed a 
cony of the lower courts decision, or included it in his response 
to the States motion. This is clearly reflected in trie Court of 
Anneals decision. Counsel's response in set forth in Appendix H. 
After the courts decision was released, counsel waited for 
29 days to advies the Petitioner of the decision. Nine days past 
the tine wr.en a petition for rehearing could have been filed, and 
counsel couli have advised the court tnat the petitioner was re-
sentenced to oerfect his appeal as of right. When contacted by 
the petitioner, counsel toll rim that even if he won on appeal, 
the prosecutor would charge him with a nore sever crime, and that 
he should takes his chances with the 3oard of Pardons. As this 
Court is aware, a defer lant cannot be cnarged with a more severe 
crime after a successful appeal. 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 
Certiorari should be granted for two reasons: This petition 
presents an issue already resolved by this Court, and the decision 
below conflicts, by implication, with previous decisions of this 
Court. 
This Court visited the issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990). Holding that 
an Anders brief filed by counsel, such as it was was insufficient 
to have aff- rde 1 the appellant effective assistance of counsel. 
Such was tne case in the instant matter. Judge i\oell found tnat 
counsels failure to file an adequate brief denied the petitioner 
of his right to effective assistance of counsel. The resentencing 
of the petitioner was in essence under tne standard set forth in 
State v, Johnson, 6*55 ?.2d 31 (1981). 
This Court has r.e 1 i that ineffective assistance of counsel on 
appeal is not a car to further review, ^ee Junn at 878. The error 
in this matter cane wnen counsel failed to aivise the court of the 
ture ^acts of the case. If counsel ineffectively represents his 
client, is the client prejudiced. In )unn this Court held that, 
11
 The doctrines of waiver and res judicata do not stand as an 
unyeilding bar to the litigation of claims that eitner once were 
or corld have been litigated in a prior proceeding. . . • The 
policy of finality certainly does have a high place in our hierarcny 
of judicial values, but that policy is not so compelling as to be 
more important than tne vindication of a person1s constitutional 
right to a fair trial, notwithstanding the defaults of a defendants 
attorney." Kurst v. Cook 777 P.2d 1029, 1034-35 (Utah 1989). 
In Dunn this Court stated; "Howsoever desirable it may be to 
adhere to the rules, the law should not be so blind and unreasoning 
that where an injustice has resulted the defendant should be without 
a remedy." The petitioner in the instant matter has been lenied 
effective assistance of counsel throughout tne duration of this 
matter. TTis original appellate counsel filed a useless brief, and 
then counsel on this appeal failed to aivise the court of the facts 
relevent to the appeal, and the reason for the resentencing. 
Counsel failed to investigate the circumstances of the macter, and 
his failure prejudiced the petitioner. Jee otate v. Frame 723 P«2d 
401, 405 (Utah 1986). Under the standard set f.rth in Strickland 
£ 
7, \ashinpton, £66 b.S. 580, zre netitiorer must snou tnat nis 
counsel nerfomance fell below a reasonable standard, ^nder 
Strickland, nthe Sixtn Ameniment imposes on counsel a duty to 
investigate, because reasonaol*; effective assistance must be 
cased on professional decision and informed legal choices can De 
nade only after investigation of options." _Id. at 690-91. 
It is oovious that the petitioner was prejudiced due to counsels 
failure to advise the court wny tne petitioner was resentenced. 
Counsels failure satisfies the two orong Strickland standard, 
Tf counsel had performed reascrably, the court wouli not nave 
granted summary iisoosition. See also State v. /erde, 101 Utah Adv 
Rep. at 38. 
As this Court stated in Dunn, tne law should not be so 
blind as to ignore an obvious injustice. The petitioner is only 
trying to get his first appeal as of rignt. x.e r.as been continually 
denied effective assistance of counsel. His first appeal was lost 
because counsel failed to cite law or supporting case citing, his 
second appeal was lost because counsel failed to advise the court 
of the circunstances. Txnis Court has the opportunity to rig.it 
a number of wrongs. 
WHEREFORE the petitioner prays that this Court will grant 
certiorari and review this matter, and allow the petitioner to his 
right of appeal. 
)ATFD this day of January, 1992. 
Sonald R. Allen 
APPENDIX A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Donald Ray Allen, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
DEC Q 21991 
^ j te ry T. Noonan 
5tem of tf\e Court 
$3ft Oxirt of Appeals 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 910316-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 2, 1991) 
Second District, Davis County 
The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby 
Attorneys: Michael D. Murphy, Kaysville, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and J. Kevin Murphy, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Russon, Bench, and Greenwood• 
PER CURIAM: 
Appellant Donald Ray Allen seeks to appeal from his 
conviction for aggravated assault, a third degree felony* The 
case is before the court on a sua sponte motion for summary 
disposition based upon the fact that appellants appeal has 
previously been considered and determined by this court. Both 
appellant and the State of Utah have filed responsive memoranda. 
The original Judgment, Sentence and Commitment was entered 
on March 20, 1989. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on July 
19, 1989. The conviction was later affirmed in an unpublished 
decision. See State v. Allen, No. 890449 (Utah App. May 29, 
1990) (per curiam). That decision fully considered the merits of 
appellant's claim that the evidence presented at trial was 
insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Appellant did not 
file a petition for rehearing in this court or a petition for 
writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court. 
On April 1, 1991, the trial court entered a second judgment 
and commitment and reimposed the original sentence. On April 12, 
1991, appellant filed a notice of appeal from that judgment. The 
trial court record reflects that the trial court appointed 
counsel to handle an appeal and has monitored the progress of the 
appeal. 
This court requested memoranda addressing why this appeal 
should not be summarily disposed of, based upon the culmination 
of appellant's original appeal of right. The State of Utah has 
addressed this issue; however, appellant simply reargues the 
merits of the sufficiency of the evidence claim and completely 
fails to consider the threshold issue raised by this court. The 
State notes that the trial court record does not contain any 
explanation for resentencing appellant to allow a second appeal. 
The State then urges affirmance based upon res judicata by virtue 
of this court's determination of the original appeal, which 
raised insufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction as 
its sole issue. 
The procedure and authority to re-sentence a criminal 
defendant and allow an appeal of right after the expiration of 
the time to appeal has its source in State v. Johnson, 63 5 P.2d 
3 6 (Utah 1981). That case provides that where a defendant has 
been denied his constitutional right to an appeal, the defendant 
may file a motion for relief under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 65B (i). In Johnson, defendant's appointed appellate 
counsel failed to file a notice of appeal, despite defendant's 
repeated requests. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
If the facts alleged by the defendant are 
true - that within the statutory period for 
appeal he requested counsel to take an appeal 
and counsel gave defendant reason to believe 
that he would but then failed to do so -
defendant was denied a constitutional right 
and must be provided an opportunity to take a 
direct appeal from his conviction. His 
remedy to establish the denial of his right 
to appeal is not in this court; it lies in 
the district court, which can receive 
evidence (including the taking of oral 
testimony, if necessary) and make findings of 
fact. 
635 P.2d at 38. 
In this case, there is no indication that the resentencing 
resulted from a motion under State v. Johnson, and the record 
contains no findings of fact in support of resentencing. In 
addition, appellant's conviction was affirmed after appellant 
fully pursued his first appeal of right. Accordingly, any 
subsequent challenge to the conviction must be by way of a 
collateral attack and under the restrictions applicable to such 
challenges. See, e.g., Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990). 
Appellant is not entitled to a second direct appeal from his 
conviction. 
The appeal is dismissed based upon our prior affirmance of 
the conviction in the first appeal of right. 
/2 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
APPENDIX E 
:\??!2-DIX 3 
i^RTICLE I SIJCTICXT 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel , to demand the nature of the accusation against bin, 
to liave a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to }:e confronted by 
witnesses against him, to liave compulsory process to compel witnesses in his 
ov/n belialf
 f to have a speedy and public trial by -an impartial jury, of the county 
or district where the offense was alleged to have been committed and the right 
to appeal in all cases. 
APPEN JIX C 
"\P?£I T)IX C 
YTTTDT?^ VI r.?0 7I£E CONSTITUTION 07 
In vail criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy tne right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wiierein the 
crime shall lave "?een committee, ;£iich district snail have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 
to be confronted with witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 





State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appel~.ee, 
v. Case No. 890449-CA 
Don Allen, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
PARTIES: 
Stanley S. Adams 
Attorney for Appellant 
807 East South Temple, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
Judith H. Atherton 
B U I L D I N G M A I L 
TRIAL JUDGE: 
Honorable Douglas Cornaby 
May 29, 1990. MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Publication) 
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and 
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is 
now ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the 
district court herein be, and the same is, affirmed. 
Opinion of the Court by PER CURIAM. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of May, 1990, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION was 
deposited in the United States mail or personally delivered to 
each of the above parties. 
Deputy C l e r k Z 7 
TRIAL COURT: >^ 
Davis County Court Second District Court Case No. 6187 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS F I L E D 
Sta te of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Donald R. Allen, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ooooo MAfc£ 91990 
MEMORANDUM DECISIONJirtiC^urfrfA^weis 
(Not for P u b l i c a t i o n ) 
Case No. 890449-CA 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Davidson. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals from his conviction of assault/ a third 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b) 
(1990). Defendant claims on appeal that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm. 
The State claims the court should decline to rule on the 
merits of the appeal because defendant's brief contains no 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on. Although we could dispose of the case on this 
basis, we decline to do so and instead examine the merits of 
the appeal. 
In reviewing a claim that the evidence is insufficient to 
support a conviction, we view the evidence in the record and 
all the inferences which may be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 
342, 345 (Utah 1985). In addition, we recognize that it is the 
jury's exclusive function to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses and we defer to the jury's determination as long as 
there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from 
which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made. State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Defendant and Gwen Allen were married on July 17, 1988. 
On July 23, 1988, defendant, Gwen, defendant's two minor 
children and some friends spent the afternoon riding horses. 
The four adults consumed beer during the afternoon. After 
returning home to defendant's parents' residence where 
defendant, Gwen, and the two children lived, defendant took his 
children into the house. Defendant and Gwen sat in defendant's 
father's pick-up truck drinking beer. While defendant and Gwen 
were in the truck, Gwen was shot in the right side of her head 
with a Smith and Wesson .44 Special. Defendant and his mother 
carried Gwen into the house, gave her a shower and put her to 
bed. Defendant removed the bloody seat cover from the truck 
and washed it. Gwen remained in defendant's parents' home for 
the next week without medical assistance. Julie Krump, 
defendant's friend, called during that week and was not 
permitted to speak with Gwen. 
On July 30, 1988, defendant and his mother took Gwen to 
the hospital. After an x-ray revealed bullet fragments in 
Gwen's brain, Gwen underwent surgery to remove the bullet 
fragments and ultimately recovered. 
At trial, defendant testified that on the night of the 
shooting incident, Gwen was depressed about a prior arrest, got 
the gun and talked about suicide. Defendant claimed he took 
the gun away, but after Gwen grabbed for it, it went off in her 
face. Gwen testified that she could not remember the gun 
discharging. Both defendant and Gwen testified that they were 
unaware at the time of the shooting that Gwen had been shot and 
did not know she had been shot until Gwen was in the hospital. 
However, police and medical personel testified that Gwen had 
two wounds on her head, black eyes and swelling. In addition, 
a police investigation revealed bloody sheets and pillows in 
the room where Gwen stayed for the seven days following the 
shooting. 
The State's expert testified that Gwen's injury could not 
have been self-inflicted. Defendant's expert testified that 
the gun would not discharge by being bumped and was not very 
likely to discharge without the trigger being pulled. 
Detective Hedenstrom who interviewed defendant on July 30 and 
August 2 testified that defendant gave about seven different 
versions of the shooting incident during the initial 
interview. In each version, defendant stated that the gun 
accidently discharged. In addition, a nurse caring for Gwen in 
the intensive care unit testified that she overheard defendant 
tell his mother, "I did it, I didn't mean to hurt her. I only 
meant to scare her. We were struggling over the gun." The 
jury found defendant guilty of aggravated assault. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b) provides "[a] person 
commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: uses a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury.- Assault is defined as "an 
act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes 
bodily injury to another.- Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1990). 
Further, aggravated assault can be committed by intentional, 
knowing or reckless conduct. State v. McElhanev, 579 P.2d 328 
(Utah 1978) . 
In this case, the evidence established that Gwen was 
injured with a gun, clearly force likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury. The State's expert testified that the 
injury could not have been self-inflicted and defendant's own 
expert testified that the gun would not discharge without the 
trigger being pulled. Further, the nurse's testimony that 
defendant indicated that he did not mean to hurt Gwen but was 
only trying to scare her, establishes that defendant, at a 
minimum, acted recklessly. In light of the evidence presented 
at trial, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to 
support defendant's conviction. 
The conviction is affirmed. 
ALL CONCUR: 
u^c^ Jfcte—M^  Billings, Judge" 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
APPENJIX E 
EXPARTE MOTION FOR 
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME 
DO^ALD PAY ALLS:; 
Pro 3e 
P .O. Eox 250 
D r a p e r , Utah 84020 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
0 0 0 O 0 0 0 
STATE OF UTAH 
P l a i n t i f f - A p p e l l e e , 
v . 
30NAL3 RAY ALLEN, 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . Case No. 890449-CA 
0 0 0 O 0 0 0 
COKES NOW the Defendant, Donald Allen, and pursuant to Rules 
22 and 23 of this Court, Moves this Court to grant the defendant 
an extension of time to seek other counsel and to allow the Court 
time to decide defendants Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 
This Motion is based on the attached Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel. 
DATED THIS 23rd DAY OF JANUARY, 1990. 
A /V r-i^U-' 7- '///c 
DONALJ RAY ALLEN 
PRO SE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I MAILED A TRUE AND CORRECT COFY OF THE 
FOREGO I!!:- MOTIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF CCLNSSL AND FOR ENLARGEMENT 
OF TIME TO: AoS'T UTAH ATT'Y GENERAL JUDITH 3 . H. ATHERTON AT 
236 STATE CAPITOL, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84114, AND STANLEY 3 . 
ADAMS, 807 EAST SOUTH TZKPLE, SUITE 101 , SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84102, POSTAGE PRE-PAID, ON THE - ' ' DAY OF JANUARY, 1990. 
DONALD RAY ALLEN 
DONALD RAY ALLEN 
Pro Se 
P .O. Rox 250 
D r a n e r , Utah 84020 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
0 0 0 O 0 0 0 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - A p p e l l e e , 
DONALD RAY ALLEN 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT 
OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 890449-CA 
Ca tagory No. 2 
0 0 0 O 0 0 0 
COKES NO./ the Defendant, Donald P. Allen and pursuant to 
Rule 23, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 40 of the Rules 
of the Utah Court of Appeals and Title 77, Chapter 32, Section 1 
(3) of the Utah Code .mn#l Moves this Court to Appoint Counsel 
to represent him in the above-entitled matter. In support of this 
Kotion the defendant states; 
1. That counsel of record Stanley Adams has continually 
and intentionally tried to disrupt the defendants right to appeal 
which is evidenced by the numerous Motions for Extension of Time 
to file defendants 3rief. 
2. That when the brief was finally filed it had to be returned 
because it was not covered properly and the pa^es were only typed 
and printed on one side. 
1. 
3. That when the final copy of the Brief was finally filed 
it did not include any case law by which this Court could base 
any iecision, nor was there any governing authority cited. 
4. That counsel failed to comply with tne Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals, Rule 24 (a) (9), when he prepared his brief. 
5. That defendants counsel failed to give this Court any 
basis on which to make or form an opinion. 
6. mhat counsel continually demands money for the ineffective 
services he provides, and tells the defendant that unless he can 
produce more money that he might not win his appeal. 
7. That counsel appears to be intentionally sabotaging the 
defendants appeal because after paying counsel ^ 2,000.00 and '' 
giving counsel ^ firearm^ valued at i 800.00, the defendant cannot 
at this time give him any further money* 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant prays that this Court will hold a 
Hearing pursuant to Pule 40 of this Court and dismiss counsel 
Stanley Adams, and appoint competent counsel to represent him in 
this matter. 
DATED THIS 23rd DAY OF JANUARY, 1990* 
// / s~ / n 
/°*fegVZ'l //' •' t' '/f//-
__( 
DONALD R. ALLEN 
APPENDIX F 
Donald Ray Allen 
Attorney Pro Se 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff, * PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
* HABEAS CORPUS 
vs. * 
* Case No. 
DONALD RAY ALLEN, * 
De f endant. * Judge 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, DONALD RAY ALLEN, and for cause of 
action alleges as follows: 
1. A commitment order was issued on the 14th Day of March, 
1989, by the Honorable Judge Douglas C. Cornaby, Judge of the 
Second Judicial District court in and for the County of Davis, 
State of Utah, in a criminal complaint which had charged Petitioner 
with Aggravated Assault, Firearm Enhancement. 
2. That Petitioner was sentenced to two terms in the Utah 
State Prison for 0-5 years, both sentences to run consecutively. 
3. That Petitioner is currently located at the Utah State 
Prison, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020. 
4. That Petitioner's restraint is unlawful and 
unconstitutional in that Petitioner's guilty verdict was based upon 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a violation of the 6th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, in that: 
a. Defendant was denied reasonable access to the court 
because ineffective assistance of counsel in the following 
respects: 
1. Counsel did not attempt to introduce evidence 
of a piece of lead from bullet, and photos of 
the windshield, which should have been a 
material part of Defendant's defense; 
2. Defendant's counsel failed to introduce 
evidence that Defendant's wife (victim) 
attempted suicide again, two weeks before the 
trial); 
3. Defendant's counsel failed to object to a video 
of a re-enactment of the incident. Said video 
was presented without sound and narrated by 
police officers. The video without sound and 
mandated by the officers had prejudicial effect 
upon Defendant's defense; 
4. Defendant's counsel failed to challenge four 
jurors, who should have been discharged for 
2 
cause because of prior knowledge of the case 
through the media, and being questionably 
acquainted with the prosecuting attorney and 
the police officers; 
Defendant's counsel failed to challenge an 
invalid search warrant, which enabled the 
police to search Defendant's truck on the 
street and again in the house later; 
Defendant's counsel failed to object to 
testimony by the Defendant's wife (the victim) 
based on inter-spousal privilege; 
Defendant's counsel failed to object to 
statements listed from Defendant that were 
extracted by coercion at the hospital; 
Defendant's counsel failed to investigate any 
of the essential facts of the case, or to 
prepare for trial. Defendant's counsel did not 
even get a police report or rap sheet until 
after the first recess at trial; 
Defendant's counsel failed to appeal the case 
after having been requested to appeal several 
times; 
Counsel failed to impeach two state witnesses 
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who perjured themselves on the stand; 
11. Counsel failed to get pre-sentence report until 
sentencing day, and failed to go over it with 
me to challenge any inaccuracies as stated by 
law to do within ten days of sentencing; 
12. Counsel failed to call any witnesses that would 
help Petitioner's case, failing to call any 
expert witnesses on Petitioner's behalf; 
13. Counsel failed to familiarize himself with 
alternative sentencing; 
14. Counsel failed to disclose what if any strategy 
he planned on using at trial. 
b. The evidence presented to the jury clearly does not 
support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. 
c. Appellate counsel submitted a brief for Petitioner 
containing irrelevant facts and no case law. 
d. There was prosecutorial misconduct in that the State made 
numerous uninvited statements in closing argument which were 
prejudicial, misleading, untrue and statements which were in 
opposition to the evidence presented at trial. 
e. Court failed to inform Petitioner of his basic right to 
appeal. 
f. Each element of the offense was not proven beyond a 
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reasonable doubt as required by Section 76-1-501 U.C.A. (1953 as 
amended.) 
5. That Petitioner has been transferred from the county jail 
to the Utah State Prison and is there currently serving his term. 
6. That the above matters have not been previously ruled 
upon. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court: 
1. Schedule a hearing at which time Petitioner may be 
represented. 
2. Permit Petitioner, who remains indigent, to proceed 
without prepayment of costs, fees or other assessments and appoint 
petitioner counsel. 
3. Grant Petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas in 
Forma Pauperis, for witnesses and documents necessary to assist in 
the proof of the facts alleged in the petition as stated above. 
4. Issue a Petition for Post Conviction Relief to have the 
Petitioner brought before it, to the end that he may be discharged 
from the illegal and unconstitutional confinement and restraint. 
Dated this day of , 1990. 
DONALD RAY ALLEN 
Attorney Pro Se 
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APPENDIX 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
KIRK TORGENSEN (4927) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




Case No, 900907518 
STATE OF UTAH, Utah : 
State Prison, Judge Frank G. Noel 
Respondents. 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on February 1. 1991, at the hour of 10:30 a.m., before the 
Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge, presiding. Petitioner Donald Ray 
Allen, being present without counsel, respondent being 
represented by Kirk M. Torgensen, Assistant Attorney General and 
both parties agreeing that petitioner should be allowed a new 
appeal because he was not effectively represented on appeal, it 
is hereby; 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. That petitioner is to be resentenced pursuant to 
State v. Johnson, 635 P. 2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981), allowing him to 
pursue a new appeal. 
DATED this day of February, 1991. 
HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL 
Third Judicial District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to Donald Ray Allen, 




Michael D. Murphy (#5115) 
Attorney for Defendant 
93 S. Main, Suite 4 
Kaysville, Ut. 84037 
Telephone: (801) 547-9274 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee * MEMORANDUM 
vs. * Case No. 890449-CA 
DONALD R. ALLEN, * 
Defendant-Appellant. 
This case comes before this court in response to the Court's 
notice of sua sponte consideration for summary affirmance under 
rule 10 (e), of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. For the 
reasons expressed below, Defendant respectfully requests that 
summary affirmance motion be denied and that defendant be allowed 
to file a brief in this matter. The facts giving rise to this 
appeal are as follows: 
FACTS 
The defendant, Donald Allen, and Donald's wife, Gwen, and 
Donald's two children, lived in the basement of defendant's 
parents, Margaret and Donald Scholer 388 East 2625 North Layton, 
Utah residence (T.46,93). On July 23, 1988, six days after Gwen and 
Donald were married, the newlyweds, Donald's two children, and Ed 
and Linda Ferrin and their children, went to Mountain Green, Utah 
to look at some horses (T.77,165,457). During the afternoon, the 
four adults drank some beer, rode some horses, and spent time with 
their children (T.457). 
At approximately 10:15 p.m., Mr. and Mrs. Allen returned in 
Mr- Scholer's chevy pickup to their Layton, Utah residence from the 
afternoon of horseback riding (T.80). Mr. Allen brought the kids 
inside and then returned to the pickup truck where he and Gwen 
drank more beer and had a discussion concerning Gwen's legal 
difficulties (T.465-467). Gwen talked about killing herself and 
grabbed a .44 Smith and Wesson handgun from a saddleblanket inside 
the truck (T.467). Donald Allen took the gun from the defendant, 
and put the gun in his mouth and said "You want to see what it 
looks like to see somebody die.11 (T.467). Gwen grabbed Donald's 
hand, Defendant pulled back his hand, and the gun went off (T.177-
179, 468) . Defendant then felt his wife's head, noticed no holes in 
the back of her head, noticed no blood and concluded that his wife 
had not been shot (T.467-473). It was subsequently learned that 
Mrs. Allen had been shot in her head (T.181, 477). 
For the next week, until July 30, 1988, Mrs. Allen remained at 
her Layton residence where she was attended too by Mrs. Scholer and 
her husband (T.75-119). Mrs. Scholer and Mr. Allen felt that 
Mrs. Allen was suffering from a hangover and injuries incurred when 
she fell from the truck (T.82-85,92,116) . 
On Saturday, July 30, 1988, when it became apparent that Mrs. 
Allen's condition was more serious than originally thought, the 
defendant and Mrs. Scholer transported Mrs. Allen to the North 
Davis Humana Hospital (T. 105). A brain scan indicated that a 
bullet fragments were lodged in Mrs. Allen's head (T.221). Mrs. 
Allen was then transported to McKay Dee Hospital for surgery 
(T.221). 
Police officers interviewed Donald Allen while Donald was at 
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the Humana Hospital. Subsequent police interviews were conducted at 
the McKay Dee Hospital (T.211-213). Some time latter police 
searched Donald's residence and located bloody sheets and pillows 
in the room where Mrs. Allen lay ill (T.427-428). The search 
revealed the .44 Smith and Wesson handgun that inflicted the injury 
to Mrs. Allen wrapped in a towel under the driver's seat of 
Defendant's pickup and the seat cover from Mr. Scholer's pickup 
(T.382, 487). 
ARGUMENT 
The defendant has asked his appeal counsel to argue that he 
was denied his constitutional right of effective assistance of 
counsel. To establish a burden of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant has the burden of providing "specific 
identified acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance" and that absent counsel's 
error, the result would have been different. State v. Colonna, 766 
P.2d 1062, 1066 (Ut. 1988). Utah Courts of appeal have used 
"several considerations relevant to ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims: 
(1) The burden of establishing inadequate representation is on 
the defendant, "and proof of such must be a demonstrable 
reality and not a speculative matter. ..A lawyer's legitimate 
excerise of judgment in the choice of trial strategy or 
tactics that did not produce the anticipated result does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel...It must appear 
that any deficiency in counsel was prejudicial...[citations 
omitted]. 
Colonna at 1066. 
Defendant makes the following claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. First, defendant in a letter to appeal counsel 
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indicates that trial counsel did not read the police report or 
prepare for trial until after the trial's first recess. Second, 
counsel failed to make a motion to suppress evidence. Such a motion 
which would have likely excluded material evidence. 
Trial's counsel alleged failure to read the police report 
until trial court's first recess would clearly prejudice the 
defendant. The factual issues presented in Defendant's case were 
complex and defense trial counsel would need to spend, at the 
minimum, several days preparing for trial. 
The trial transcript indicates that evidence seized from Mr. 
and Mrs. Allen's bedroom, an area where defendant had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy violated defendant's constitutional right of 
privacy as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution 
and Article 1 section 14 of the Utah Constitution (T. 375). 
Defendant also advises appeallate counsel that he indicated to 
trial counsel that he was not advised of his constitution rights 
per Miranda when he was interrogated by Officer David Patterson of 
the Layton City Police Officer (T.204). 
Donald Allen next maintains that there was insufficient 
evidence to support his convinction of aggravated assault. The 
standard of review applied to such claims are well known and will 
be briefly stated here. A review court will 
"review the evidence the evidence and all inferences that 
may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict... reversing a jury conviction only when 
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted...So long as there is 
some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which 
findings of all the requisite elements can reasonably be made 
our inquiry stops.[citations omitted]. 
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 67,84 (Ut.App. 1990), 
The prosecution presented numerous witnesses and presented 
many items of physical evidence to support its claim that Donald 
Allen committed the crime of aggravated assault. One witness, Gwen 
Allen, the only eyewitness to the shooting other than the 
defendant, stated that the shooting was an accident resulting from 
her intoxication and desire to possibly commit suicide (T.162-198)• 
Mr, Allen also maintained that the shooting was an accident caused 
by defendant's intoxication and defendant's desire to commit 
suicide (T.454-516). 
Taking all of the evidence into consideration, the Defendant 
respectfully submits that the evidence is insufficiently conclusive 
to support the jury's verdict, 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above discussion, this Court should allow the 
Defendant to further brief the matters in the instant case. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this S /day of November, 1991. 
Michael D.^Murphy 
A 
Attorney for D 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
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